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proceedings. The court of appeals' rationale was that the exclusionary rule's additional deterrent effect would be insignificant or is greatly outweighed by its
detrimental effect. However, the court
therein concluded that if it can be shown
that the illegally obtained evidence provided an incentive for the illegal seizure,
the exclusionary rule would then apply.
Such incentive would be evidenced by proof
that seizure of the evidence was motivated
by the possibility of enhancing the accused's sentence. See Logan, 289 Md. at
486 and Lee, 540 F.2d at 1212.
The court in Chase also analyzed how
evidence falling under this category is handled in probation revocation proceedings
nationwide. Although the court noted
semantical differences in the various approaches, it found that the prevailing approach applied is the "cost/benefit analysis". "A probation revocation proceeding
is not a criminal prosecution but is more in
the nature of an administrative hearing intimately concerned with the probationer's
rehabilitation. Thus, the court must balance the competing interests of the community with the rehabilitative goal of probation." Chase, 68 Md. App. at 422, 511
A.2d 1128. In light of this standard, the
court concluded that the exclusionary rule
generally did not apply to probation revocation proceedings. Combining Maryland
case law with the semantical variations
that exist nationwide, the court then incorporated a good faith exception into
their newly adopted rule. In discussing
their standard, Judge Wilner wrote:
We agree, as a general proposition, that
the deterrent effect of such an application [of the exclusionary rule] will be
minimal and that whatever marginal
deterrent benefit might accrue would
be far outweighed by the harmful effect of denying access to relevant information concerning a probationer's
behavior.... [Nevertheless], [w]e cannot permit the police to use this as an
incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment .... [W]e think the best way to
deter individual violations is simply to
apply the exclusionary rule upon a
showing that the police did not act in
good faith in effecting the search and
seizure. The "good faith" standard ...
encompasses all aspects of the officer's
actions- how egregious the violation
was, whether the officer knew the person was on probation ... , what the circumstances were that led to the seizure.
Chase, 68 Md. App. at 425, 426, 511 A.2d
1128.
In concluding their discussion of the "good
faith" exception, the court held that the

burden is on the defendant initially to produce lack of good faith. Upon this production, the burden then shifts to the State to
prove otherwise.
At the time of publication this case was
set for argument before the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Although the court of
appeals granted certiorari, it is doubtful
that the case will be reversed because the
court of special appeals' reasoning follows
the national trend. Chase should help in
lessening the frustration the law enforcement community feels in their pursuit of
justice and community protection. It remains to be seen whether their pursuit will
become a reality.
-Christopher Hale

jersey Shore State Bank v. United
States: IRS NOT REQUIRED TO
PROVIDE NOTICE AND A
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT TO
A THIRD-PARTY LENDER PRIOR
TO INITIATING A CIVIL SUIT TO
COLLECT EMPLOYMENT TAXES
In Jersey Shore State Bank v. United
States, 479 U.S. __, 87-1 U.S.T.C.
para. 9131 (1987}, the Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision held that the IRS was
not required to provide notice and a demand for payment to a third-party lender
who is liable under I.R.C. § 3505 prior to
initiating a civil suit to collect employment
taxes. This decision resolved a conflict between the circuits and is consistent with
the interpretation of the Third and Ninth
circuits.
The Supreme Court in Jersey Shore State
Bank considered the relationship between
I.R.C. § 3505 (which provides for personal
liability on the part of third parties paying
or providing funds for wages) and I.R.C.
§ 6303(a) (which requires that notice of an
assessment be provided to persons liable
for unpaid taxes before an assignment can
be imposed}. In rejecting the bank's claim
that the government was required under
I.R.C. § 6303(a) to provide notice and demand for payment to a lender bank that is
liable under I.R.C. § 3505, the Court
determined that a third-party lender is not
the "person" intended to be protected under I.R.C. § 6303(a).
I.R.C. § 3505 applies to a third-party
lender, surety or other person who is not
an employer, but who pays wages either
directly to that employee or group of employees, or supplies the funds to pay those
employees. I.R.C. § 3505(a) imposes liability on those lenders, sureties or persons
for a sum equal to any unpaid withholding
taxes and interest if the wages were paid
directly to the employee. However, under
I.R.C. § 3505(b), if they did not pay the

employees directly, but provided the funds
to the employer, their liability would be
limited to 25% of the amount of the loan.
Prior to this section's enactment in 1966,
the employers were the only individuals
subject to liability.
I.R.C. § 3505 was enacted in order to
correct problems which occurred when
employers obtained net payroll financing.
United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank,
781 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1986). Net payroll financing, used frequently in the construction industry, is a practice whereby
the lender provides funds for payment of
employees' net wages, but not for payment
of withholding taxes. This type of financing usually results when a financially
strapped sub-contractor cannot meet its
payroll obligations. The general contractor will then pay the sub-contractor's employees' net wages. Problems arise when
the sub-contractor is unable to pay withholding taxes to the government while the
government is required to credit the employees account. In such cases "[r]ecourse
against the employer [is] often fruitless,
because it [is] frequently without any financial resources. And the government
could not proceed against third parties
who paid the net wages because they were
not 'employers' under the code, and therefore not liable for the taxes." United States
v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974,
976 (3d Cir. 1986).
In the current case, Jersey Shore State
Bank provided net payroll financing to
Pennmount Industries, Inc., from the
fourth quarter of 1977 through the first
quarter of 1980. The government in its
complaint alleged that Jersey Shore paid
wages directly to Pennmount employees
and supplied funds for the purpose of paying wages, with the knowledge that Pennmount did not intend to or would not be
able to make timely payments or deposits
of the federal taxes required to be deducted
and withheld. The complaint also alleges
that the Bank's liability is $76,547.57
plus interest under I.R.C. § 3505(a}, and
$72,069.00 plus interest under I.R.C.
§ 3505(b). The district court granted the
bank's motion for summary judgment because of the government's failure to provide timely notice as required by I.R.C.
§ 6303(a). The United States appealed and
the third circuit reversed. In examining
the legislative history of the statute, the
third circuit concluded that 6303(a) did
not apply to collection actions under 3505
because 6303(a) was intended to protect
taxpayers from harsh administrative collection procedures. The court noted, however, that under I.R.C. § 3505, the thirdparty lender was not in danger of having
any of its property seized or attached to
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satisfy the obligation as did an employer
under § 6303(a). The court observed that
"[i]n a civil action service of the government's complaint provides the [third-party
lender] with all the notice required .... "
781 F.2d 974 at 981 (3d Cir. 1986).
Jersey Shore, dissatisfied with the court's
ruling, petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court granted the
writ in order to resolve the inter-circuit
conflict. The Court then went on to affirm
the decision of the Third Circuit.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, observed that there are three grounds
for demonstrating a lack of connection between § 6303(a) and § 3505. First, I.R.C.
§ 3505 does not declare that a lender is
"liable for unpaid taxes" which would give
rise to the I.R.C. § 6303(a) notice requirement. Rather, a lender's liability under
§ 3505 only arises if it pays wages directly
to an employee or supplies funds for the
wages with actual notice or knowledge that
the employer is either unable to make
timely payment of the withholding taxes
or has no intention of doing so. The Court
found that a third-party lender is deemed
to have such actual notice or knowledge
from the time- in the exercise of due diligence-the lender would have been aware
that the employer would not or could not
make timely payments. "[A] prudent lender
could be alerted to its liability under section 3505 at the time it engaged in what
the government describes as net payroll
financing .... " ld. at 87,115 (1987). Furthermore, the Court noted that, "[S]ureties
can protect themselves against any losses
attributable to withholding taxes by including this risk ofliability in establishing
their premiums, and lenders by including
the amounts in their loans and taking adequate security." Citing, S. Rep. No. 1708,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1966); H.R.
Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 22
(1966).
Secondly, the Court considered the fact
that employers and lenders are in different
positions. While employers are subject to
the government's summary collection procedures soon after unpaid employment
taxes are assessed, the government may
only forcibly collect against a lender by
filing a civil suit in court. Thus, an employer has a far greater need for an assessment notice than a third-party lender who
is not subject to summary collection procedures.
Lastly, the Court considered the actual
content of the§ 6303(a) notice. Under this
section, the government must not only give
notice to each person liable for unpaid tax
but the notice must contain 1) the amount
assessed and 2) the demand for payment.
The Court pointed out that a third-party
26- The Law Forum/Spring, 1987

lender generally will not be concerned with
the amount assessed because it may include
the employer's share of the unpaid Social
Security taxes for which the lender is not
liable. See, H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966). Thus, the notice required under § 6303(a) is likely to
demand payment for an amount different
from that for which the lender is liable.
This ruling by the Supreme Court makes
clear that any lender who engages in net
payroll financing is subject to suit, without
the notice provided under 6303(a), if the
employer fails to pay or deposit the required
withholding taxes and the lender can be
said to have actual notice or knowledge
that the employer is not making timely
withholding taxes.
-Robert R. Tousey

Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates,
Inc.: MARYLAND REFUSES TO
MAKE EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY
EMPLOYEES WHO BECAME
INTOXICATED AT THEIR
OFFICE PARTIES
In Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates,

Inc., No. 711 (Md. App. filed Feb. 9, 1987),
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
affirmed the dismissal from the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, by holding that an employer who allegedly served
alcohol to an employee at a party, who later
crashed his car into an automobile, was not
liable for his employee's actions.
Because the case was dismissed below,
under Maryland Rule 2-322(2), the factual
allegations advanced to Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland were taken directly
from the complaint, averring that Evelyn
Hargis was killed instantly when the vehicle she was driving was struck head-on
on December 23, 1985. Ms. Hargis was
survived by her husband Jesse W. Kuykendall, and a minor daughter, Christina.
The complaint stated that Charles E.
Wilkes, Jr. and Robert Dean Wade, employees of Top Notch Laminates, Inc.
(Top Notch), "were driving their separate
cars while drunk." According to the allegations contained in the complaint, Wilkes
and Wade were "swerving back and forth
on the roadway trying to pass or to prevent
the other from passing." During their
"horse-play", Wilkes "swerved across
the center line at a high rate of speed directly into the path of the car driven by
Ms. Hargis." (slip op. at p. 1).
Immediately prior to this occurrence
both Wilkes and Wade had been attending
a Christmas party hosted by their employer
Top Notch, attendance to which was not

required. (Emphasis supplied). The complaint averred that Wilkes and Wade had
been drinking "constantly from 12:30 p.m.
to 5:00 p.m. and became highly intoxicated." The complaint further indicated
that Top Notch knew of their intoxicated
condition, but continued to serve both men
alcoholic beverages. (Id. slip op. at 2).
From these facts Mr. Kuykendall filed suit
against Top Notch, for himself, as personal
representative of Ms. Hargis' estate, and
for the couple's minor daughter, Christina
(Appellants). The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Top Notch's motion to dismiss, with which this appeal
ensued.
On appeal, the court of special appeals
was presented with the question of whether
the employer could be held accountable
for the actions ofWade and Wilkes, under
traditional theories of negligence. As a preliminary matter, the court reviewed the
elements of a negligence cause of action,
(1) a legal duty, (2) a failure to perform the
duty, (3) damage to the plaintiff, and (4) the
damage occasioned by the defendant's failure to perform the duty. The appellants
first argued that the legal duty owed by
Top Notch was established because of the
"special relationship" established between
employer and employee. The appellants
theory was based upon the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 315, which provides:

"There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another
unless
(a) a special relation exists between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection." (Emphasis
added). !d. slip op. at 6.
The appellants alleged that this relationship "conferred a duty upon Top Notch
(the actor) to control the actions of Wilkes
(the third person), as well as a duty to the
general public to protect them from injury
by Wilkes." (Id. slip op. at 6). This duty,
appellants argued, was then breached when
Top Notch permitted Wilkes and Wade to
drive their own cars, because Top Notch
chose not to prevent the two men from
driving home while intoxicated.
Appellants' second argument was that
the employer failed to exercise reasonable
care to avoid injury to third persons, thereby
relying on Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark,
668 S. W .2d 307 ( 1983). In Otis, the Texas
Supreme Court decided that, "an employer
who knew his employee was incapacitated

